Submitted by Ilanna Sharon Mandel
For every historical event, there are numerous interpretations as to why it occurred. The UN Mandate to create the State of Israel involved a complexity of issues and complications whose ramifications continue to resonate in the world today. The reasons for the creation of the Mandate and the resulting fate of the Palestinian people began long before the actual Mandate itself. To analyze why the UN created Israel, we have to consider several contributing factors: the force and desires of the Zionist movement, the Balfour Declaration, the relationship between Britain, the United States and various Arab countries, British and American interests in Palestine and the impact of the Holocaust.
According to researcher, Walid Khalidi, the push for the Jewish State began in the late 19th Century long before the Mandate ever took place. At that time, prominent Zionist, Theodor Herzel published the draft for a ‘Charter’ to colonize Palestine. This draft was the product of the First Zionist Congress in 1897 (6). Therefore, half a century before the Mandate ever took effect forces were in place for the creation of the State of Israel.
If we are to understand events in relative chronological order then the next event to impact on Palestine was the Balfour Declaration. Researcher, Joe Stork contends that although the Declaration was humanitarian in tone it was almost the opposite in its intent.
He wrote:
Nevertheless, on November 7, 1917 the British government
would come out in open support of the creation of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine, by issuing the Balfour Declaration in
the form of a letter from the Foreign Secretary Balfour to
Lord Walter Rothschild. (10)
In fact, Stork opines that contrary to the spirit of the Declaration, “those British statesmen most closely connected with the Declaration were almost openly anti-semitic[…]” (Stork 9). According to Stork, Lord Mark Sykes (a key player in the Declaration) saw the Zionist movement and moving the Jews to Palestine as a means of solving “the Jewish Question” (Stork 8). British interests in Palestine and their desire to rid the U.K. of Jews who had successfully assimilated into British culture were, according to Stork, definite factors in the push to create Israel. Also, the Zionists pleased many of the players involved with the Balfour Declaration with what they perceived of as a ‘pro-British’ stance. Another fact of the times was the British government’s perception of not only the Zionists, but also world Jewry in general. According to Stork, the British were convinced that “the Jews represented significant power and influence” (Stork 11).
The actions of Lord Balfour also signaled the beginning of Britain’s attempts to distance themselves from Palestinian interests and ally themselves with the needs of the Zionists. In the original Declaration, there was a condition on the establishment of a Jewish homeland that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Chomsky 90). However, two years later, Balfour’s words were quite different and his stance was entirely pro-Zionist. In the space of only two years, Balfour had essentially abandoned the Palestinian people and any interests or claims they had in Palestine. In a memorandum, Balfour wrote:
The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism,
be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition,
in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than
the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit
that ancient land. (Chomsky 91)
One can already see that the Balfour Declaration, in tandem with Zionist interests were working together to take over Palestine. If Stork’s recounting of historical events is accurate then in fact the British government and the Zionists saw an opportunity to use each other. Thus, they could satisfy their mutual interests in taking over Palestine.
Another key element in this saga (that continues to have strong ramifications today) was the fate of the Palestinians living in Palestine at the time. Again, according to Stork, “[…]the Zionist leaders saw no contradiction between their project for an autonomous Jewish state and the self-determination of the people then living in Palestine. The element of colonization was central to the Zionist program, and colonization depended on imperial power” (13).
Again, British and Zionist interests were working together. Britain’s desire to control that region of the world fit in nicely with the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state. However, according to Stork’s quote above, neither of these groups seemed particularly concerned with the fate of the Palestinians. In fact, researcher, Walid Khalidi, points out that the British attitude during the time of its Mandate in Palestine (1917-1947) were contrary to any of the interests or needs of the Palestinians living in Palestine. Khalidi contends that the British military put down all Palestinian resistance in order to facilitate the Zionist power (Khalidi 6).
According to researcher and professor, Ilan Pappe, the resistance was not only a response to British rule. The Palestinian population was becoming increasingly concerned with the significant increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine. Pappe contends that this increase by Jews into Palestine was fueled by fear of Nazi policies in Germany (9). Nevertheless, the Palestinians revolted but were put down by the British.
Noam Chomsky also mentions the revolt in his own work. However, he argues that the Palestinian revolt grew out of years of frustration at previous attempts to get the attention of the British. “In 1936-9, the Palestinian Arabs attempted a nationalist revolt after the failure of a long strike, which was ignored and ineffectual” (91). Chomsky then points out that David Ben-Gurion recognized the revolt for what it was, an attempt by the Palestinians to assert their claim to Palestine, and let the Zionists know they would not simply accept what they deemed to be an intrusion onto their land” (Chomsky 91). However, despite Ben-Gurion’s recognition of this truth, his actions, according to Khalidi, were quite the opposite.
We [also] learn from the official history of the Haganah that in the summer of 1937, ten years before the UN partition resolution, Ben-Gurion ordered the Haganah commander of Tel Aviv, Elimelech Silkowitz to draw up a plan for the military takeover of the entire country in anticipation of Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine expected in the wake of the Peel Report. (7)
One of the great questions that emerged from that time in history and the events that were to unfold is the impact of the Holocaust on the creation of Israel. Once the realities of the Holocaust set in, events in Palestine began to change quite drastically. Khalidi argues that American interests in the area were suddenly asserted by President Truman in a very aggressive manner. He contends that Truman put “persistent harassment and pressure on Britain during 1945-46 to let as many Jews as it is possible to let into the country [of Palestine]” (8). However, Khalidi does not believe that Truman did so out of any sympathy for the fate the Jewish people suffered in Nazi-occupied Europe. Rather, he suggests that Truman, who would face re-election in 1948 was courting the Jewish vote. Also, he states that Truman’s actions could have been interpreted as humanitarian if “Truman had simultaneously urged the admission of Jewish refugees into the United States. In the years 1932-43, the vast continent of the United States had received 170,883 Jews, while the miniscule Palestine had received 232,524 during the same period” (9).
Professor Ilan Pappé is not as certain in his interpretation of Truman’s actions. Nevertheless, he points out the various forces impacting on Truman and his behavior at the time. He says:
Some assert that the Zionist movement benefited from frictions between the USA and Britain on various global matters, which pushed the American administration into a more pro-Zionist attitude. Others emphasize that Truman’s sincere concern for the plight of European Jewry played an important role in the pro-Zionist policy of his administration. Michael Cohen points out that Truman had other more mundane reasons for airing his sympathies for the Jewish victims. As a non-elected president eager to succeed in his own right […] Truman could hardly have failed to be less than hypersensitive to this question. (12)
The late Palestinian author, Edward W. Said, describes how the push to create Israel assumed almost mythical proportions in light of the events of World War II. He points out that the Zionists had been settling Palestine for decades prior to the UN Mandate and the Holocaust. However, the events in Europe empowered the Zionists and those who worked with them to reinterpret the settling of Palestine as a drama of redemption. It was no longer a political message or even a spiritual one that laid claim to the land on religious grounds. “Later the redemptive message of the reconstruction was changed to meet the situation created by the concrete horrors of the Holocaust; Palestine as refuge, as affirmative action for those dispossessed Jews not massacred by Germany” (Said 103). In other words, Jewish settlements in Palestine were no longer about the politics of the Zionist movement, but an attempt to save a people from genocide.
While Said acknowledges the horrors of the Holocaust, he undeniably argues that the creation of Israel was a colonial movement.
Because the Palestinian, who may seem only picturesque
to most people, is a reminder that before the state of Israel
existed there were natives in Palestine; rather than acknow-
ledge that Israel rules a colonial population, the philosopher
must now go back over his own earlier arguments against
colonialism, discover merits in the colonizing community,
and then say that since colonialism is, after all, practiced
by a community of people with undeniable moral rights,
it cannot be so bad. (141)
Another post-World War II factor was the emergence of Russia as an ally for the Zionists. Ilan Pappé proposes that the shift in Soviet attitude paved the way for partition. Once the US realized that the Soviets would vote for partition, they had to support it as well. In Pappé’s theory, the US was especially concerned that the Soviets would wield too much power in the region if the US was not also involved. Therefore, they both ultimately voted for partition. (20)
Pappé also argues that the Exodus affair may have been the single event that enabled partition to be a certainty.
The Exodus was a Jewish refugee ship which had sailed
from France to Palestine in the summer of 1947 and tried
to break through the British blockade to bring its passengers
ashore. The ship’s arrival coincided with UNSCOP’s visit.
There could not have been a better demonstration of the
ineluctable link between the fate of European Jewry and
that of the Jewish community in Palestine. (24)
The Exodus affair altered the world’s opinion and created greater sympathy for the hundreds of thousands of European Jews seeking entrance into Palestine. The fact that the British remained absolutely unmoved by the plight of the Jews on Exodus certainly underscored the desires of the Zionist Movement. The British could have shown mercy and allowed the Jews through the blockade. They did not. With the members of UNSCOP in the area at the time, Britain’s actions seemed heartless and no doubt pushed the members of the Committee into favoring partition (Pappé 24-25).
However, if the Exodus incident had not occurred then the visit by UNSCOP to the Displaced Persons Camps would have swung the vote in the Zionist’s favor. There, the Committee members had to face over 350,000 Holocaust survivors. No matter what land claims the Palestinians had in their favor, the Committee could not bring themselves to ignore the plight of those who had survived the Nazi death camps. The Committee became convinced that a Jewish state was now the only solution (Ibid 25).
According to researcher, Shlomo Slonim, although the White House was firm in its support for partition, there were last minute efforts by the US State Department to derail partition. In fact, the State Department was extremely concerned that partition was “[…]contrary to the interests of the United States. He warned of the loss of friendship in the Arab world […] Henderson and other State Department officials obviously felt that Truman’s propartition stand was misguided and would seriously endanger American interests in the Middle East” (502).
According to Noam Chomsky, the American efforts to support partition may have been in part a humanitarian stance. However, there was no doubt that Zionists, especially the American Zionists wanted to create the State of Israel. Chomsky asserts that the push for the Jewish state was in due in part to the fact that no other alternatives was being offered even though many European Jews may have preferred a different choice, preferably to live in America.
As the vote moved closer, the Arab delegation unfortunately did not help themselves. Their refusal to meet with UNSCOP sealed their fate in the minds of the UN.
When the committee arrived in Palestine it was warmly
welcomed by the Jews and boycotted by the Arab Higher
Committee. This tilted the committee to the Jewish
side and it was also impressed by the military strength
of the Jews and their achievements in expanding their settlements.
After the visit to Palestine most committee members agreed
with the Zionists that the demographic situation of the Jews
in Europe had to be linked with that of the Jewish settlement
in Palestine. (Pappé 12)
At this point, those in the world which had previously supported, or tried to protect Palestinian interests now turned away and supported the Zionist push for the State of Israel. The various forces described above — the Balfour Declaration, the Holocaust, American and British interests all played a strong role in the push for partition. As a result, the Palestinian people became a non-entity in their own land. As hundreds of thousands of European Jews poured into Palestine, spurred on by world sympathy (and possibly guilt for their fate), the Palestinians were now constructed as the ‘outsiders’ in Palestine. Although they had lived there continuously for centuries, owned the highest percentage of land and were the majority culture, they no longer belonged in their own country. Someone had to be sacrificed in order to accommodate the world’s growing push for partition and the Palestinians were the ones fated to be those people.
In his book, After the Sky, Edward W. Said relates this sad story of his own mother’s fate in 1948:
Immediately after she and my father were married at the
mandatory government’s registry office, a British official
ripped up her passport. To her remonstrations and queries
he replied, in effect, this negation of your separate identity
will enable us to provide a legal place for one more Jewish
immigrant from Europe. (78)
The world could only turn away from the Palestinian people and their fate by reconstructing them as the ‘others’ — those who no longer belonged in Palestine unless they would agree to live under the laws of the Jewish State. Whether or not the world truly cared about what had happened to European Jewry in the Holocaust no longer mattered. While Arab states made one last ditch effort to prevent partition, it failed. The General Assembly of the United Nations voted in favor of the creation of the State of Israel on November 29, 1947. Truly, an extraordinary series of events had taken place in order for this to occur, and ramifications that are even more dramatic have taken place since.
In the end, the UN voted for partition of Palestine in 1947 because they could no longer refuse not to. Too many forces were in place pushing for partition and whether or not the Palestinian people would suffer as a result had sadly become a non-issue.
UNSCOP is the acronym for the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
Endnotes
1. According to Stork: “The demand of world Jewry, under Zionist leadership, for a British-administered mandate, would help provide the necessary diplomatic leverage. France could thereby be removed from any post-war position in Palestine…British interests would be protected and represented without the complications of direct annexation”, Stork, Joe. Understanding the Balfour Declaration, 13, 1972, 9-13.
2. “…while the Balfour Declaration did not represent any sort of quid pro quo arrangement between the Zionists and the British War Cabinet, it was issues with the interests of the Empire uppermost in mind”, Ibid, p. 13.
3. “Equally forgotten in historical invisibility is the crushing by British military might of the desperate Palestinian national rebellion against the Royal Commission (Peel) Report of 1937 calling for the partition of the country and the consequent destruction of all effective Palestinian political and military organizations”, Khalidi, Walid. Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution., (6).
4. In his book, The Fateful Triangle, The United States, Israel and the Palestinians, Chomsky quotes Ben-Gurion’s recognition of the situation as one of deep discontent by the Palestinian people. “[…]let us not ignore the truth among ourselves […] The country is theirs, because they inhabit it, whereas we want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take away from them their country, while we are still outside. The revolt is an active resistance by the Palestinians to what they regard as a usurpation of their homeland by the Jews…Behind the terrorist movement, which though primitive is not devoid of idealism and self sacrifice” (91-92).
5. Khalidi contends that Truman’s constant insistence on large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine began a path of deserting any Palestinian interests in the area. “But it was his use of this demand as a battering ram against the British and his public support on Yom Kippur (4 October 1946) for a Jewish Agency plan for partitioning Palestine that destroyed all possibility of Anglo-American cooperation in the resolution of the Palestine problem […] This contributed decisively to Britain’s resolve to abandon the [British] Mandate and remove itself as a buffer between Jew and Palestinian — a strategic objective of Ben Gurion’s sat least since 1930” (9).
6. Here, Slonim refers to Mr. Loy Henderson, head of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the Department of State (496).
7. According to researcher, Yuen-Li Liang, During the session from September 23-November 29, 1947, “[…]the legal aspects of the whole Palestine problem and the competence of the United Nations to implement proposals for partition were brought up by the representatives of several Arab States who challenged the legality that the United Nations lacked the necessary power to decide to partition Palestine” (650).
Bibliography
Chomsky, Noam. The Fateful Triangle The United Sates, Israel and the Palestinians. Boston: South End Press, 1983.
Khalidi, Walid, “Revisiting The UNGA Partition Resolution” Journal of Palestine Studies 27.1 (1997): 5-21.
Liang, Yuen-Li. “The Palestine Commission” The American Journal of International Law 42 (1948): 649-656.
Pappé, Ilan. The Making of The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1951. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1992.
Said, Edward W. After the Last Sky. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Slonim, Shlomo, “The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine” Political Science Quarterly 94 (1979): 495-514.
Stork, Joe, “Understanding the Balfour Declaration”, Middle East Research and Information Project Report 13 (1972): 9-13.
